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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Jason Amboh's petition for post- 
conviction relief. Clerk's Record (R) 76-79. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On March 11, 2009, Mr. Amboh filed apro  se petition for post-conviction relief. In the 
petition, Mr. Amboh stated that he pled guilty to DUI and was sentenced on June 21,2007. R 1. 
Mr. Amboh alleged three grounds for relief in his petition: 1) that trial counsel did not file 
a timely appeal; 2) that trial counsel and the state appellate defender did not infonn him when his 
appeal was "denied"; and 3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the criminal 
case and/or on appeal. R 2. 
Mr. ~ m b o h  appended a letter to his petition from his defender, Robert Eldredge. 
The letter, dated August 14,2007, states that Mr. Eldredge had received Mr. Amboh's letter 
dated August 12, 2007, which requested that a notice of appeal he filed. However, Mr. Eldredge 
stated that the letter had al~ived too late for a timely notice of appeal. Nonetheless, Mr. Eldredge 
stated, "I have filed the Appeal anyway." (Emphasis original.) Mr. Eldredge's letter further 
stated that he did not believe that an appeal would be helpful and that Mr. Amboh could pursue 
post-conviction relief citing Criminal Rule 57. R 8. 
Mr. Amboh's petition also included an affidavit from Molly Buskey of the State 
Appellate Defender. Ms. Huskey stated that her office was appointed to represent Mr. Amboh on 
direct appeal on August 15, 2007. R 9. However, he was not assigned an individual attorney at 
that time, because the transcripts and record were not yet available. R 10. And, before Mr. 
Amboh could be assigned an individual attorney, his appeal was dismissed as untimely. R. 11- 
12. Because Mr. Amboh did not have an individual attorney assigned, no letter was sent to him 
notifying him of the dismissal of his appeal. R 12. Fuither, he did not contact SAPD until 
February 2,2009, and at that time, a review of the status of the case was made. R 12 
Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Amboh on his petition. R 44. 
The state moved for summary dismissal. R 50. Following oral argument, the District 
Court summarily dismissed the petition on two grounds: 1) it was untimely; and 2) there was no 
genuine issue of fact in dispute. Tr. p. 10, In. 5 - p. 11, In. 17. In dismissing the petition, the 
Court stated: 
It's a jurisdictional issue. If we had the standard that defendant didn't know, they 
would all claim they didn't know and there wouldn't be any time limit at all to file 
post conviction because they would all claim they didn't know the proverbial 
'disposition' of the case. 
Tr. p. 10, in. 18-24 
This appeal timely followed. R 67. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the statute of limitation be tolled given that Mr. Amboh's petition raises 
important due process claims and he did not discover the facts underlying his claims until after 
the time period had run? 
2. Did Mr. Amboh's petition alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to file a 
timely notice of appeal raise a genuine issue of mateiial fact? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Statute of Limitation Should Have Been Tolled Until Mr. Amboh 
Discovered the Facts Underlying his Claim. 
The District Courl erred in not finding that the statute of limitation was tolled due to the 
admitted failure of defense coiinsel, both trial counsel and appellate counsel, to notify Mr 
Amboh of the dismissal of his appeal. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that petitions for post-conviction relief be filed "within 
one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." And, the failure 
to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal, unless the petitioner has shown a reason why the 
statute of limitation should be tolled. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453,454, 210 P.3d 561, 562 
(Ct. App. 2009), citing Eveizsioky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967, 969 (2001) and 
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). The question of whether 
the District Coilit erred in not tolling the post-conviction statute of limitation is subject to free 
review. Persoiz, supra 
The time limitation for filing a post-conviction petition should be enlarged when the 
petitioner has been effectively denied access to the courts. Sayas v. State, supra, citing Anderson 
v.  State, 133 1daho'788,792,992 P.2d 783,787 (Ct. App. 1999). While the bar for equitable 
tolling is high, tolling is appropriate in at least three situations: 1) where the petitioner was 
incarcerated in an out-of-state facjlity on an in-state conviction without legal representation or 
access to Idaho legal materials; 2) where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication rendered 
a petitioner incompetent and prevented the petitioner from earlier pursing a challenge to his 
conviction; and 3) where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues, the 
limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the 
claim. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1 ,  4 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, citing 
Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,536,944 P.2d 127, 133 (Ct. App. 1994); Sayas v. State, supra; 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900,904-05, 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2008). 
Mr. Amboh's case involves this third ground for tolling. Mr. Amboh's petition raises an 
important due process claim; specifically, the claim that counsel did not file a timely appeal. See, 
Judd v. State, supra, citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000); Goodwin 
v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272-73, 61 P.3d 626,629-30 (Ct. App. 2002); LaBelle v. State, 130 
Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct.App. 1997); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,900 P.2d 221 
(Ct. App. 313,900 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1995); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 591-93, 861 P.2d 
1253, 1256-58 (Ct. App. 1993). Likewise, Mr. Amhoh's claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective raise a significant due process claim as the state and federal constitutions require 
effective assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho at 316,900 P.2d at 224. As set out in Rhoades v. State, - 
Idaho , P.3d - 2009 WL 3415732 " 5 ". . . the serious due process concerns enunciated 
in Charboneau encompass cases involving access to the courts claims. It would similarly cover 
claims of incompetency." (Citations omitted.) 
Further, Mr. Amboh did not discover the facts underlying his claim of failure to file a 
timely appeal until after the limitation period had run. Mr. Amboh was specifically told by trial 
counsel that a direct appeal had been filed. And, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel told 
him when his direct appeal was dismissed. Rather, he did not find out that his appeal had been 
dismissed until February 2,2009. And, he filed his petition for post-conviction relief less than 
six weeks later, on March 1 I ,  2009. 
Under these circumstances, the Dist~ict Court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Amboh's petition on the grounds that it was untimely. Mr. Amboh's petition raised an important 
due pl-ocess claim and he did not discover the facts underlying his claim, that counsel's late filing 
of a notice of appeal was not effective and that his appeal was dismissed, until after the statute of 
limitation had run. Under these circumstances, the statute of limitation should have been tolled. 
Judd, supra. 
The District Court dismissed Mr. Amboh's petition not only because it believed it was 
untimely, but also because i t  believed that the petition did not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. However, it is clear that the issue Mr. Amboh pled, whether counsel was ineffective when 
he failed to file a timely notice of appeal, raises a genuine issue of material fact and the District 
Court's decision to the contrary should be reversed 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rhoades v. State, supra at 3 
. . . On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party. However, 'while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, 
the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted.' 
Id., at 3-4 (citations omitted). See also, Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838-9, 172 P.3d 
1109, 11 13-4 (2007) (standard of liberal construction is applied in order to avoid dismissal of an 
inartfully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the claims sought to be asserted). 
In this case, Mr. Amboh raised a claim that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to 
file a timely notice of appeal. And, indeed, the record bears this out. Mr. Amboh's direct appeal 
was dismissed because the notice of appeal was untimely. This claim does raise a genuine issue 
of material fact. 
Per Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. at 1035, an attorney who disregards 
specific instructions from a client to file a notice of appeal has I-endered constitutionally 
unreasonable assistance. Likewise, an attorney who follows the explicit instructions of a client 
not to file a notice of appeal has not rendered unreasonable assistance. Stricklaizd v. Washington, 
466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. See also, Goodwirz v. State, 138 Idaho at 272,61 P.3d at 629. 
In cases in the middle, where the client has neither instructed counsel to file or not to file 
a notice of appeal, a separate, but antecedent, question must be addressed: whether counsel in 
fact consulted with the client about an appeal. If counsel did consult with the client, counsel's 
performance is deficient only if helshe failed to follow the client's express instructions. And, if 
counsel has not consulted with the client, then a second subsidiary question must be addressed: 
whether counsel's failure to consult amounts to deficient performance. Counsel has a 
constitutionally imposed duty to consultwith the client about an appeal when there is reason to 
think either (1) that a rational client would want to appeal (for example, when there are non- 
frivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular client has reasonably demonstrated to 
counsel that helshe was interested in appealing. In making this determination, the court must 
take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 479, 120 S.Ct. at 1036. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 273,61 P.3d at 630, "If counsel has not 
consulted with the defendant, then counsel's perfoi~nance in failing to consult with the defendant 
is itself deficient if a rational defendant would want to appeal or the particular defendant 
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he or she was interested in appealing." 
To show prejudice if counsel has rendered deficient performance in not consulting with 
the client, it must be shown that if not for the failure to consult, the client would have timely 
appealed. Flares-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1038. Goodwin, supra. 
In this case, Mr. Ainboh alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a timely 
notice of appeal. And, the state admitted that a timely notice was not filed. This raised a genuine 
issue of material fact. If the failure to file the notice of appeal occurred despite Mr. Amboh's 
request to file an appeal, then the failui-e was deficient performance and there is a presumption of 
prejt~dice I-equiring post-conviction relief. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. at 483, 120 S.Ct. at 1038. 
And, if the failure accursed in the absence of either direction from Mr. Amboh or consultation 
regarding appellate rights from counsel, then the secondary question must be addressed: whether 
counsel had a constitutional duty to consult with Mr. Amboh. The answer to that question 
depends upon whether ( I )  a rational client would have wanted to appeal or (2) Mr. Amboh 
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. And, if it is determined that counsel 
had a duty to consult with Mr. Amboh and failed in that duty, the question of prejudice must be 
addressed: whether there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure, Mr. Amboh 
would have timely appealed. Flores-Ortegcl, 528 U.S. at 469-84, 120 S. Ct. at 1035-38. 
While Mr. Amboh's petition might have been better drafted by an attorney, it clearly 
raised the question of whether. counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely 
notice of appeal. This was a genuine issue of material fact and consequently, summary dismissa1 
was inappropriate. ffauschuld v. State, supra. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the District Court erred in both its conclusions - that the statute of limitation 
shauld not be tolled and that the petition did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel - the order summarily dismissing Mr. Amboh's 
petition should now be reversed and the matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
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